RE: RULING OF THE COMMISSION IN RESPECT OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACTING COORDINATOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

ANNEXURE A

List of Documents that could be utilised by the Commission in the Public Hearing

ITEM No	Document	Date
1	INTELLIGENCE BRIEF: Justice Crime Prevention and Security Cluster	November: 2024 (for a December 2024 JCPS Workshop)
2	Minutes: NICOC Meeting	11 February 2025
3	Minister's Letter to the IGI	11 February 2025
4	**IGI**'s Response to the Minister	12 February 2025
5	Underhanded Machinations of the Inspector-General of Intelligence Regarding Crime Intelligence	25 May 2025
5	Questionable Credibility Of IDAC	21 July 2025
6	2022 NIE: (Domestic Section and corresponding NIPs **excluding Counterintelligence Chapter**)	15 March 2022
7	2023 NIE: (Domestic Section and corresponding NIPs **excluding Counterintelligence Chapter**)	17 May 2023
8	2024 – 2029 NIE: (Domestic Section and corresponding NIPs **excluding Counterintelligence Chapter**)	20 February 2024
9	2025 NIE: (Domestic Section and corresponding NIPs **excluding Counterintelligence Chapter**)	29 July 2025

REMARK: *The Commission is humbly requested to not project the documents to the Public to avoid unauthorised reproduction of the material.*

This request is merely a security control measure and it is by no means geared to obstruct the important work of the Commission in anyway.

RE: RULING OF THE COMMISSION IN RESPECT OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACTING COORDINATOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

ANNEXURE B

List of Documents that cannot be utilised by the Commission in the Public Hearing

ITEM No	Document	Rationale
1	Corruption Within [redacted]	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
2	Disinformation and [redacted]	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing

		operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
3	UPDATE: Allegations of Links [redacted]	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the

		Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
4	UPDATE: Contamination of [redacted]	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations

		between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
5	Looming Instability [redacted]	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
5	Dangerous Intertwine [redacted]	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing

		operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
6	Threat to the Integrity [redacted]	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the

		Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
7	Special Report Threat to the Integrity [redacted]	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations

		between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
8	[redacted] A Smokescreen to [redacted]	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
9	Record of the Legislated NICOC Members Meeting 01 December 2025	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing

		operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
10	Record of the Legislated NICOC Members Meeting 22 October 2025	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the

		Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
11	2022 NIE: Counterintelligence Chapter	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations

		between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
12	2023 NIE: Counterintelligence Chapter	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
13	2024 – 2029 NIE: Counterintelligence Chapter	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing

		operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts
14	2025 NIE: Counterintelligence Chapter	• Its public ventilation carries national security risks and will potentially compromise ongoing operations, as well as weaken the State's ability to detect and respond to threats. • Its disclosure might be used by malicious and hostile elements to disrupt the objectives and functions of the

		Intelligence Community • Its uncontrolled disclosure will jeopardise the established institutional trust and cooperation, but will render the NICOC ineffective • Compromising of operational relations between the country's Intelligence Services and their Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS) counterparts

RE: RULING OF THE COMMISSION IN RESPECT OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE ACTING COORDINATOR FOR INTELLIGENCE

ANNEXURE C

List of Documents that could be utilised by the Commission in the Public Hearing which may be projected at the discretion of the Commission

ITEM No	Document	Section
1	Concerns Regarding the Activities of the Suspended Inspector-General	• Page 2 of 8 • Page 3 of 8 • Page 8 of 8
2	Request for Access to Information (Project Files): Intelligence Oversight Engagements for the Financial Year 2024/25: South African Police Service: Crime Intelligence Division	• Page 1 – 3 of Page 1 – 3
3	News24 – Intel Report: SIU Must Charge Top Cops, Recover R121m	• Page 1 – 15 of Page 1 – 15
4	Report: Investigation on Matters of Crime Intelligence in Terms of Section 7(7)(c) of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, 1994 (Act 40 of 1994) (Oversight Act)	• Page 1 – 13 of Page 1 – 13
5	Underhanded Machinations of the Inspector-General of Intelligence Regarding Crime Intelligence	• Page 3 of 8
6	Signed MoU Between the IGI and IPID	• Page 1 – 9 of Page 1 – 9