



COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CRIMINALITY,
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AND CORRUPTION
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM



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**JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CRIMINALITY, POLITICAL
INTERFERENCE AND CORRUPTION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
ARISING FROM THE SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS MADE PUBLIC BY LIEUTENANT
GENERAL NHLANHLA MKHWANAZI ON 6 JULY 2025**

WITNESS STATEMENT OF



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INTRODUCTION

- 1 I am an adult male, Sergeant in the South African Police Service ("**SAPS**"). I am a member of the Political Killings Task Team ("**PKTT**") and a Certified Forensic Investigator, specialising in Fraud and Corruption Investigations.
- 2 The facts set out in this statement are within my personal knowledge unless otherwise stated or indicated by the context.
- 3 To the extent possible or feasible I will attach any documents I rely on in substantiation of the averments I make.

BACKGROUND/SERVICE HISTORY

- 4 I joined the SAPS in January 2001 and worked as a Registry Clerk in the Central Firearms Registry. My professional duties involved capturing and updating firearm applications on a computerised system and administering the registry.
- 5 In 2004, I joined the Police Service and attended Police College commencing 1 July 2004. In 2006, I was appointed as an Investigator at O.R Tambo International Airport Visible Policing and Operations where I investigated various offences such as murder, the smuggling of illicit cargo as well as immigration offences in terms of section 49 of the Immigration Act, 13 of 2002.



- 6 In 2015, I was appointed as a Sergeant and continued to work as an Investigator. And in 2020, I joined the PKTT where I conduct organised crime investigations into the contract killings of politicians and office bearers, University of Fort Hare staff members and several high-profile persons in Gauteng Province.
- 7 I have over the years taken steps to further my studies including obtaining a qualification from the University of South Africa in Forensic and Investigative Auditing. This has given me specialist skills in forensic analysis.
- 8 My full-service history is marked and annexed as “**WC1**”.

MAIN MATTERS TO BE ADDRESSED IN THIS STATEMENT

- 9 My testimony covers the following five broad themes:
- 9.1 The 6 December 2024 operation at the residence of Mr Vusimuzi Matlala.
- 9.2 The 12 December 2024 raid on the prison cell of Mr Katiso Molefe at Groenpunt Correctional Facility in the Free State.
- 9.3 The events of 17 December 2024 and the ensuing manhunt for Lucky Boitumelo Molefe.
- 9.4 The 18 and 19 December 2024 firearm compliance operation at CAT VIP Security and subsequent litigation.



9.5 The 14 May 2025 arrest of Mr Matlala and his disclosures.

10 In the course of giving my evidence, I will refer to the following relevant SAPS dockets:

10.1 **Erasmia Cas 104/11/24:** This concerned the kidnapping of the family members of businessman Mr AB Dikgale, Mrs Nqobile Dikgale and her son who were abducted outside Copperleaf Golf and Country Estate in Centurion.

10.2 **Wierdabrug Cas 315/11/2024:** This related to the kidnapping of Mr Jerry Boshoga, a business man who was kidnapped in November 2024 at or around Centurion. Videos of a severely assaulted Mr Boshoga being tortured and pleading for his life had been sent to his family by his kidnappers who had demanded a ransom of R25 million in bitcoin.

10.3 **Vereeniging CAS 275/2024:** the murder of Transnet employee, Mr Armand Swart on 17 April 2024. Mr Armand Swart, an employee at Q Tech Engineering Company based in Vereeniging was shot and killed outside his workplace. Mr Swarts' employer, Q Tech had allegedly reported price inflation in a Transnet contract which revealed a complex case entwined with organised crime, police corruption, and substantial personal risk for investigators. Related to these are:



10.3.1 Kliprivier CAS 77/04/2024: the arrest of accused Tiego Mabusela (an accused in the Swart murder) who was found in possession of an unlicensed firearm.

10.3.2 Bramley CAS 149/04/2024 – the arrest of the suspects linked to the Swart murder in possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunition.

10.3.3 Sunnyside CAS 286/01/2024 – related to the hijacking of a vehicle used in the commission of Mr Swart's murder.

10.4 **Sandton 436/10/2023:** concerning the attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder in relation to Johannesburg socialite Ms Tebogo Thobejane, Anele Malinga and Khumbulani Ncube. These charges were recently expanded to include:

10.4.1 Lyttleton 167/8/20222: Attempted murder of Mr Joe Sibanyoni, Mr Sandile Masimule, Mr Donald Motau, Mr Bethuel Cele and Mr Francis Mazibuko. The firearms used in the commission of this crime are linked to the firearms identified in the Vereeniging case.

10.4.2 Pretoria west 447/1/2024: Attempted murder of Mr Austin Seuntjie Mokubung also known as DJ Vettys, Mr Tshwarelo Pitse and Mr Buhle Masango. The firearms used in the commission of this crime are linked to those identified in the Bramley case.



MY ROLE IN THE POLITICAL KILLINGS TASK TEAM

- 11 I joined the PKTT on 5 May 2020 as an investigator. Since then, I have worked under the command of Lt-Gen Khumalo.
- 12 Upon joining the PKTT, I was based in Kwa-Zulu Natal province, and my primary role was the investigation of politically related murders. In 2023, the PKTT's scope was expanded to include the University of Fort Hare ("**UFH**") investigations. In September/October 2023, I joined the UFH team.
- 13 The Task Team is an inter-disciplinary unit. In the course of my duties, I would routinely work in conjunction with the following:
- 13.1 The Director of Public Prosecutions KZN.
- 13.2 The Department of Correctional Services ("**DCS**") assists with matters such as witness protection and prisoner transfers.
- 14 The PKTT operates under a Mission Area Joint Operational Centre ("**MAJOC**") based at SAPS KZN HQ and four Tactical Joint Operational Centres ("**TACJOCs**") which are set up, roughly by region/district, to manage clusters of cases.



- 15 Prior to my deployment to Gauteng, I was deployed at Alice TACJOC in Eastern Cape.

MY DEPLOYMENT TO GAUTENG COUNTER INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

- 16 I was deployed to join the Gauteng Counter Intelligence Operations Team (“**GCI Ops**”) in December 2024. Some members of the PKTT were deployed before I joined GCI Ops.
- 17 On 2 December 2024, I arrived in Gauteng and reported for duty.
- 18 On that day:
- 18.1 I was introduced to my Commanders and the members of the GCI Ops team.
- 18.2 I received a briefing on the Vereeniging murder case relating to the murder of Armand Swart on 17 April 2024. The initial briefing also detailed the link between the Vereeniging murder case and the Bramley, Sunnyside and Kliprivier cases.
- 18.3 I came to meet the two remaining detectives in respect of the Vereeniging murder case. I came to know that in the course of their investigation – they had faced a number of obstructions and irregularities, including the deliberate omission of crucial information in



forensic ballistics reporting, the discovery of suspects' connections to senior SAPS officials; offers of bribes and threats against their lives. I was informed that they are under 24/7 protection and that I would be expected to reside with them at a safe house and follow the precautionary measures in place.

18.4 It was explained to me that given these ongoing challenges, I along with other members of the PKTT had been deployed to work with GCI Ops. In particular to ensure that the two remaining detectives seized with the investigation (Sergeants [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were provided with assistance and support from law enforcement agencies falling outside of Gauteng Province.

19 As a PKTT member deployed to GCI Ops, I have integrated into the GCI Ops team. The dockets I work on are dockets assigned to and belonging to GCI Ops. In the discharge of our duties, our investigations and operations take place under the custody and direction of Lt- Gen Khumalo and his team.

THEME ONE: 6 DECEMBER OPERATION AT THE RESIDENCE OF MR MATLALA

20 On 3 December 2024, I received copies of two kidnapping dockets that the GCI Ops team was working on. These were:

20.1 Wierdabrug Cas 315/11/2024. This related to the Jerry Boshoga kidnapping as discussed above.



- 20.2 Erasmia Cas 104/11/24. This concerned the kidnapping of Mrs Nqobile Dikgale and her son who were abducted outside Copperleaf Golf and Country Estate in Centurion.
- 21 The PKTT became involved in the kidnapping investigation at the intervention of the National Commissioner who engaged Lt-Gen Khumalo. During the course of that investigation, Mr Matlala was identified as a person of interest in the kidnapping of Mr Boshoga and reliable information had been received by the team that Mr Boshoga was being held at Mr Matlala's house.
- 22 Based on the status of the investigations, the team planned to execute three operations on 6 December 2024:
- 22.1 The arrest of Mr Katiso Molefe in relation to the Swart Murder.
- 22.2 The arrest of Mr Lucky Boitumelo Molefe (Mr Katiso Molefe's nephew and Transnet employee) for his role in the Swart murder.
- 22.3 An operation of the residence of Mr Matlala.
- 23 In light of the co-ordinated manner in which our team operates, I attended to the operation scheduled at Mr Matlala's residence and other members of my team pursued the other tasks.



BRIEFING AT SPECIAL TASK FORCE OFFICES

- 24 On 6 December 2024 at around 14h00, I attended at the Special Task Force (“**STF**”) Offices with our Commander and Warrant Officer Ndumiso from the SAPS Forensic Science Laboratory (“**FSL**”) and a member of the PKTT. The purpose of that meeting was to brief the STF members who were joining us on the operation as well as to plan and coordinate the intended operation at Mr Matlala’s house.
- 25 We departed from the STF Offices at around 17h00. We were a convoy of around 20 members and drove towards the residence of Mr Matlala in Pretoria East. Upon arrival at Mr Matlala’s residence, we encountered two security guards at the gate, Mr Archibald Khoza and Mr Sipho Mokwana. The combat members neutralised the two security guards and breached the residence i.e. they facilitated our entry onto the property. Once the residence was secure, W/Officer Ndumiso and I were then informed that we may enter the house.

SEARCH FOR MR BOSHOGA

- 26 The FSL member and I conducted a walkthrough of the residence as we looked for Mr Boshoga. W/Officer Ndumiso’s role was to take photographic evidence of the scenes. As we proceeded, members of the combat team would direct us into rooms that were occupied by persons so that we could enter and conduct our search for Mr Boshoga.



- 27 The first individual we encountered was Mr Yussufu Mtupanyama inside one of the rooms in the main house. Mr Yussufu, a Malawian national indicated that he worked for Mr Matlala as a general worker. He immediately told us that “the boss is not there.” Which we understood to be a reference to Mr Matlala. We searched the room and determined that Mr Boshoga was not inside.
- 28 In the same room where Mr Yussufu was found, I noticed a white sheet was tied to the window. The white sheet was distinctive in that it was torn on the sides and had uneven edging. It looked very similar to the one behind Mr Boshoga in the ransom videos sent to his family.
- 29 I asked Mr Yussufu what the purpose of the sheet was and where he got it from. He responded that he got it from his boss but didn’t say when. I directly questioned him about the whereabouts of Mr Boshoga, and he replied that he did not know him.
- 30 Soon thereafter, I was called by a member of the combat team to come to the cottage, which was located outside the main house. I requested another member of the combat team to remain in the room with Mr Yussufu to prevent him evading further questioning and went to the cottage to conduct a further search for Mr Boshoga.
- 31 Inside the cottage I encountered Mr Vusimuzi Mzimela and Mr Siyabonga Mthethwa in the sleeping quarters. They explained that they worked as security



guards for CAT VIP Security, a security company owned by Mr Matlala. They explained that they reside in the back cottage. While speaking to them, I observed x2 pistols lying under a pillow and further observed x2 rifles propped against the wall.

32 I immediately inquired from them who the firearms belonged to, and they said that the firearms belonged to CAT VIP Security. CAT VIP Security is a protection and asset management company owned by Mr Matlala. It is based at Menlyn Central Office in Pretoria. I demanded that they provide me with the permit for the firearms, which they did.

33 I identified the following irregularities:

33.1 After I was provided with the permit, I scrutinised it and formed an initial view that it was in contravention of the Firearms Control Act, 60 of 2000. This is because the signature on the permit was pre-signed or electronically signed – in contravention of the Act.

33.2 Furthermore, I pointed out to them that the law requires that firearms must be locked in a secure safe. Instead, the firearms were exposed and there was no visible safe in the room.

34 I recorded the serial numbers of the firearms and directed that all four firearms be seized. The firearms were seized. We conducted a full search of the cottage and determined that Mr Boshoga was not there.



35 I left the cottage and made my way back to the main house to continue interviewing Mr Yussufu. Mr Yussufu thereafter escorted me to another cottage located outside of the main house where Mr Nkosinathi Baloyi resided (the younger brother of Mrs Tsakane Matlala). I again conducted a search for Mr Boshoga, but that room was empty.

36 I thereafter went outside and proceeded to take down vehicle registration numbers for the cars located in the premises. At that stage, a white Toyota Corolla entered the residence. I approached the driver of the car and asked him to identify himself as this was a police operation. I also asked him what he was doing there, he responded that he was Given Tshepo Makofane, and that he worked for Cat VIP Security as a driver of Mr Matlala. Mr Makofane told me that he had just received a call from Mr Matlala to say come and get him.

37 At that stage, a combat member advised me that my Commander was looking for me. I left Mr Makofane with a combat member and was led to the main bedroom inside the house where I found my Commander, along with Mr and Mrs Matlala.

INTERVIEW WITH MR MATLALA

38 Upon my entry into the bedroom, Mr Matlala requested that Mrs Matlala exit the main bedroom, which she did. I thereafter remained in the main bedroom with Mr Matlala and my Commander. A search was conducted of the room and Mr



Matlala showed me his 9mm firearm that was placed on his pedestal. I queried him on why his firearm was exposed and not secured in a safe. He attempted to point out a safe to me but was unsuccessful, I resolved to seize the firearm for non-compliance with the Act. For security purposes, a combat member stood on the other side of the bedroom door.

39 Mr Matlala provided us with his cell phone, gave us consent to access it and we proceeded to interview him.

40 My Commander introduced me to Mr Matlala and informed me that Mr Matlala had said that he wanted to talk to us. Mr Matlala indicated that he knew the reason for us being at his residence. He said he was aware that we are looking for Mr AB Dikgale's wife and child. He spoke about their kidnapping and mentioned that he has assisted another Pakistani family to reunite with their relative after a family member was kidnapped. He reasoned that he was able to assist them through his connections in the security industry, but that people now suspected him of being involved in kidnappings.

41 We asked him about his criminal background, and he spoke candidly about his involvements in a range of serious crimes such as robberies and Cash-In-Transit heists but insisted that this was in the past.

42 When asked if he knew Mr Boshoga, he confirmed that he had known him since 2012, where they had engaged in criminal activities together. But he denied



knowledge of Mr Boshoga's whereabouts. He explained that he had been speaking to the family of Mr Boshoga as they had approached him for assistance in locating him.

43 Mr Matlala explained that he doesn't know the identity of the people behind the kidnapping but suspected that it related to a money debt as Mr Boshoga was involved in the drug business. He informed us that he had lent Mr Boshoga R5 million as Mr Boshoga expressed to him that he wanted to buy a machine used in the processing of drugs.

44 He also identified business associates of Mr Boshoga who operated in the drug underworld. He said that he heard from Mr Boshoga that he had fallen out with one of them and they may have sought to harm him. But insisted that he couldn't offer anything on Mr Boshoga's whereabouts.

45 During the course of our engagements. Mr Matlala proceeded to make several startling disclosures. These are reflected below:

45.1 Firstly, he informed us that he was the recipient of a R1.2 billion SAPS tender.

45.2 Secondly, that he has connections to very senior officials within the SAPS. These included Deputy National Commissioner Gen Sibiya, General Feroz Khan and General Shibiri. And that he was related (familial) to Gen Senona.



- 45.3 Thirdly, that Gen Senona and Gen Sibiya had assisted him in securing the tender at SAPS.
- 45.4 Fourthly, in respect of General Kahn, he said that he would regularly utilise his penthouse at Menlyn Maine, Pretoria. When queried on why Gen Khan would use his penthouse – he replied that he didn't know as the Gen would just show up there.
- 45.5 Fifth, Mr Matlala told us that he knew we were coming to his house that day. He showed us on his phone, the call history between him and Sergeant FE Nkosi from that day. He told us that that he was tipped off through two calls – one advising that we were attending a briefing at STF Offices (14h07) and a further call advising of our departure to the Matlala residence (17h03)
- 45.6 Sixth, he further said that he is in communication with the Police Minister and that he was supposed to meet the Minister tonight. He explained that his relationship and the intended meeting with the Minister were facilitated by a third party associated to the Minister.
- 45.7 Finally, he provided us with the name of his friend Mr Calvin Rafadi, who he said operated in the IT space and who he had assisted in paying his school fees in exchange for meeting his IT-related needs.



46 Following the termination of the interview with Mr Matlala, the team was satisfied that it had conducted a thorough search of the house and had unfortunately not found Mr Boshoga. The team withdrew from the residence.

47 I prepared a report summarising the outcome of the operation. This included:

47.1 The seizure of three iPhones belonging to Mr and Mrs Matlala as well as x2 burner phones found in their possession. With their consent, these were taken for downloading and imaging.

47.2 The seizure of five firearms, four belonging to CAT VIP Security which were found in the cottage with the guards and Mr Matlala's personal firearm, as seized in his bedroom.

47.3 A list identifying all the individuals found at the residence, including the couple's four children.

48 The next day, I attended at the Brooklyn Police station where the cell phones were booked for further investigation and Inquiry 1/12/2024 was opened in respect of the seized firearms. My affidavit confirming this is attached as "**WC2**"

49 The inquiry was assigned to the responsible warrant officer.

50 On 12 December 2024, I returned to the residence of Mr Matlala to hand back their cell phones which had been taken in for downloading and imaging. SAPS



Cyber Crimes Unit was unable to download and image the cellphones, even service providers in the private sector were unable to access the phones.

51 Upon debriefing and reflecting on the operation I drew the following observations which were material to the GCI Ops team and our investigations into Mr Matlala.

51.1 We established that Mr Matlala held a R360 million tender with the SAPS.

51.2 Despite his admitted lengthy criminal history, he reportedly had close relationships with very senior SAPS members.

51.3 Mr Matlala himself informed us that he had advance knowledge of our movements and SAPS operations and that this information was leaked to him from inside the SAPS.

51.4 The likelihood of a tip-off about our presence is supported by the sudden arrival of Mr Given Makofane from CAT VIP Security who told me that he had just received a call from Mr Matlala to come and get him. I strongly believe that the tip off enabled Mr Matlala to take other measures, including moving Mr Boshoga from the house and placing software on his cellphones to frustrate attempts to access the cellphones once he knew that we were coming.



THEME TWO: 12 DECEMBER 2024 RAID ON THE PRISON CELL OF MR KATISO MOLEFE

- 52 On 6 December 2024, GCI Ops conducted a parallel operation wherein they arrested Mr Katiso Molefe as the fourth accused in respect of Vereeniging Cas 275/04/2024 – Swart Murder. His co-accused being Michael Pule Tau, Musa Kekana and Tiego Mabusela.
- 53 After my involvement in the 6 December 2024 operation at the Matlala residence, I joined my colleagues to assist them to advance the Armand Swart murder case involving Mr Molefe.
- 54 On 12 December 2024, we received intel that Mr Molefe who was detained at Groenpunt Facility in the Free State was apparently in possession of a cellphone. I drove to Groenpunt, and a search of his cell was conducted. We did not find a cellphone. We instead found a notice of rights with telephone numbers on the back, the J50 form prepared by a SAPS colleague, as well as a new set of POLO tracksuits in his cell.
- 55 Upon questioning him about these items, Mr Molefe informed us that Brigadier Nkwashu had visited him in prison and brought him the POLO tracksuits. I found it startling that a senior SAPS official who had no active involvement in the murder investigation would visit an accused of a serious crime at a prison facility. We took steps to determine the facts surrounding this.



56 Our inquiries revealed that Brig Nkwashu had attended at the prison facility on
9 December 2024 and introduced himself as the brother-in-law of Mr Molefe.
The Brigadier allegedly informed the prison officials that the accused Mr Molefe
was arrested at the airport and was therefore not in possession of any clothes
or food. He therefore wanted to see the suspect. The prison officials
further advised that Brig Nkwashu had arrived at the facility after visiting
hours, driving a white BMW SUV that had no number plates. This was
alarming to them because if Brig Nkwashu attended in his official capacity,
they questioned the removal of the vehicle registration plates.

57 The statements of these prison officials are attached as **"WC3."**

58 On 10 December 2024, the Head of Groenpunt Facility, Mr Nkoli, went into
the accused's cell to ask him if he was related to Brigadier Nkwashu. Mr
Molefe said that he was not related to Brig Nkwashu.

59 His affidavit recording this is **"WC4"**.

60 Again, a pattern of well-resourced and dangerous criminal accused who were
connected to senior SAPS officials, and who seemingly performed favours for
them continued to emerge.



THEME THREE: EVENTS OF 17 DECEMBER 2024 AND THE MANHUNT FOR LUCKY BOITUMELO MOLEFE.

61 Following the arrest of Mr Molefe, we were actively looking for Mr Lucky Boitumelo Molefe, a Transnet employee and the nephew of Mr Katiso Molefe. It was our belief that the murder suspects orchestrated the assassination of Mr Swart with the involvement of Mr Lucky Molefe, who was also linked to fraud and corruption regarding a Transnet tender contract. A warrant of arrest had been issued for Mr Lucky Molefe, but he had failed to show up at work and had seemingly gone into hiding.

62 In the furtherance of our manhunt, on 12 December 2024, I proceeded to Randburg Magistrate's Court where an application for a search warrant of Mr Lucky's Molefe apartment was made. The search warrant was denied. The Magistrate reasoned that the items sought, namely a company laptop and related electronic devices, belonged to Transnet and that the respective Investigative Officer must approach the work manager for access to the laptop, alternatively if he was working from home – Transnet must open a theft case to retrieve the laptop.

63 That affidavit is marked and attached as "**WC5**".

64 Undeterred we continued to search for Lucky Molefe.



65 On 17 December 2024, SAPS members intercepted Lebohang Molefe, the sister of Mr Lucky Molefe, who was still at large. We interviewed her in order to obtain knowledge of his whereabouts as he had gone missing since the arrest of Mr Molefe on 6 December 2024.

66 The interview was conducted by myself and Sergeants [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at Muldersdrift, SAPS. The interview was conducted in a room that was in full view of the public and had no curtains. During the interview, Lebohang Molefe gave me to consent to go through her phone, and I checked her phone logs. I established that her phone is linked to that of Mr Lucky Molefe and they often share geo-locations with each other. I also found a voice note on her phone warning Mr Lucky Molefe to keep his phone off and to stay indoors. I informed Ms Lebohang Molefe that a warrant of arrest had been issued for her brother and that it was a crime to conceal his whereabouts and facilitate his evasion of arrest. In the interview, Lebohang said that Lucky had gone to their Aunt's house, Ms Moloi, to hide there. She took us to Ms Moloi's home in Natalspruit, Ekurhuleni. The combat team secured the house and found their cousin Mr Phumulo Fana Moloi. Due to heavy rain and not enough space at the house for an interview, the SAPS team arranged that everyone go to Natalspruit SAPS for a formal interview. Once we were there, Mr Phumulo Moloi told us that his friends had seen Mr Lucky Molefe driving around Cradle section in a white Audi A4 but that he had not seen or spoken to him.



67 Lebohang Molefe said that Ms Fundiswa Nyalunge, the partner of Mr Katiso Molefe will know where her brother, Lucky Molefe is. Ms Lebohang Molefe thereafter took us to the house of Ms Nyalungu in Fourways. We were given consent to go through her phone. From an inspection of the phone, I saw that it was Ms Nyalungu that advised Ms Lebohang Molefe to tell Lucky Molefe not to use electronic payment. We could not find Mr Lucky Molefe at Ms Nyalungus home. She agreed to a search of her home. I also informed Ms Nyalungu that a warrant of arrest had been issued for Mr Lucky Molefe and that it was a crime to conceal his whereabouts and facilitate his evasion of arrest. She then told us that the last known place where he was known to be is at a family house in Standerton. She said that she doesn't know the directions there and that Ms Lebohang Molefe is the best person to take us to that family house.

68 We all thereafter proceeded to Standerton along with Ms Lebohang and Ms Nyalungu. Upon arrival at the house, the combat members breached the property, and a search conducted. Mr Lucky Molefe was not found. The house had CCTV, and we located the DVR and confiscated it. We reported to the Sakhile SAPS and made an OB entry under SAPS 13/411/2024. The team drove back to Gauteng, and we dropped off Ms Fundiswa and Ms Lebohang at their respective residences.

69 I record that an active search for Mr Lucky Molefe remains active. I mark and attach a SAPS communique to this effect as **"WC6."**



70 Ms Lebohang Molefe and Ms Nyalungu have since accused the team of kidnapping them. As detailed above, their account is untrue and is in our belief directed at protecting ongoing criminality perpetrated by their family members. The kidnapping case had the ultimate goal of stalling and preventing the administration of justice. This topic is addressed further in a later topic in this statement.

THEME FOUR: 18 AND 19 DECEMBER 2024 OPERATION AT CAT VIP SECURITY

71 In light of the various irregularities, we identified with the firearms found at Mr Matlala's residence, a firearm compliance inspection of CAT VIP Security necessary.

72 On 18 December 2024, I attended the offices of CAT VIP Security, Menlyn with W/O Ndumiso of SAPS FSL and W/O Barath a firearm inspector from SAPS. W/O Barath W/Officer Barath is the Designed Firearms Officer and was responsible for conducting the firearm compliance inspection.

73 Upon arrival at the offices, Mr Mawethu Maxwell Sankobe, the Firearm Logistics Manager was not available. Mr Sankobe and W/O Barath spoke over the phone, and we arranged with him that we would come back the following day, 19th December 2024.



- 74 On 19 December 2024, we again attended at the offices of CAT VIP Security. The compliance inspection was scheduled for 10h00. Mr Sankobe, Mr Matlala and his lawyer Mr Schule were there. Mr Matlala asked to be excused.
- 75 During the compliance inspection, several irregularities were observed by W/O Barath. One such irregularity was that the permit for the firearms was pre-signed by the previous Logistics Manager for the firearms and not Mr Sankobe. W/Officer Barath questioned this and did not receive satisfactory answers from Mr Sankobe. This gave rise to further questions about the lawfulness of this permit and whether it still applied in light of the fact that a new logistics manager had been appointed.
- 76 Furthermore, as we proceeded to enter the firearm safe, we were informed that whilst Mr Sankobe was in possession of the keys to the firearm safe, the spare key was in possession of Mr Matlala. This was also in contravention of the Firearms Control Act – which required that the person responsible in terms of the Act must maintain exclusive access to firearms, ammunition and protective equipment as held in safe or string room.
- 77 Based on the above and further irregularities, W/O Barath decided to confiscate all the firearms at CAT VIP Security. W/O Barath, Mr Schule and Mr Sankobe phoned Mr Matlala to bring the spare keys to the office however Mr Matlala did not cooperate. Using Mr Sankobe's keys – we opened the safe, inspected the



contents of the strong room, W/Officer Ndumiso photographed the contents, packaged and seized them. A while later Mr Matlala sent another employee to hand us the duplicate keys but did not come to the offices himself.

78 The next day, I proceeded to Brooklyn SAPS and ensured that all the firearms are booked in under SAPS13/697/2024. This inquiry is the responsibility of W/Officer Barath as the Designed Firearms Officer.

79 On 17 December 2024 already, Mr Matlala had instituted urgent proceedings in the Pretoria High Court against the Minister of Police and Others in respect of the 6 December 2024 operation at Mr Matlala's house.

80 In that urgent application, he sought an order that the SAPS return to him several items including a Rolex watch, a cartier ladies watch, 5 firearms, 1 x apple MacBook and x 2 iPhones. He alleged that the firearms and personal effects were unlawfully seized.

81 The founding papers are marked and attached as "**WC7**".

82 On 23 December 2024, Gen Mbuso Khumalo deposed to an answering affidavit refuting Mr Matlala's claims. He made several points including that the cellphones had already been returned to Mr Matlala, that the firearms had not been unlawfully taken but were seized due to non-compliance with the Firearms



Control Act and were now the subject of an ongoing inquiry registered at Brooklyn SAPS. The answering affidavit is marked and attached as “**WC8.**”

- 83 Subsequent to the filing of our answering affidavit, Mr Matlala withdrew his application. His notice of withdrawal is marked and attached as “**WC9.**”

THEME FIVE: MATLALA ARREST

- 84 On 13 May 2025, a warrant of arrest was issued in respect of Mr Matlala.
- 85 I prepared the J50 application for the warrant, but it was a culmination of team work on the investigations.
- 86 Mr Matlala stands as accused number 3 in the Sandton case attempted murder of Johannesburg socialite Ms Tebogo Thobejane and her associates. His co-accused being Musa Kekana, Tiego Floyd Mabusela, Tsakani Matlala (Mr Matlala’s wife), and Mabusela’s daughter, Nthabiseng Nzama. Our investigations point towards him playing the role of mastermind and financier in the hits.
- 87 In the course of our investigation into Mr Matlala, various analysis was conducted including call data and phone analysis as well as looking at bank accounts used and linked to the suspects.



- 88 We learned that there was communication between the suspected hitmen that linked back to Mr Matlala, bank analysis that reflected payments made close to the attempted hit that traced back to the accused, as well as witness testimony.
- 89 On the 14 May 2025, we initiated a reconnaissance effort in respect of Mr Matlala. He was surveyed by SAPS members and then arrested in Midrand, just off New Road. We were able to apprehend Mr Matlala because the car he was travelling in that he *fortuitously* had a car puncture, and we were able to arrest him as his motorcade had been standing alongside the road.
- 90 Mr Matlala was read his rights and arrested on three counts of conspiracy to commit murder, and we proceeded to Boksburg SAPS. He asked to have an informal talk with us before being booked in. We were able to secure an office in the police station where myself, Sergeants [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] engaged him.
- 91 The chat is recorded. In the course of talking to us he made further revelations that more concerning than those disclosed on 6 December 2024. In talking to him, he would reference chats on his face in support of what he was sharing with us. In the course of this section, I will reference chats obtained from Mr Matlala's phone in support of what he shared with us.



MINISTER MCHUNU

- 92 Mr Matlala explained that Minister Mchunu had ambitions to run for the President of the African National Congress and was that the Minister was going around and looking for campaign contributions.
- 93 Mr Matlala indicated that he had donated around R500 000 to this campaign.
- 94 When questioned on whether he believed that the Minister would succeed in his campaign for the Presidency, Mr Matlala replied that he did not believe the Minister would win in his campaign but that he never said this directly because he didn't want to discourage the Minister. Mr Matlala informed us that he complained to Brown Mogotsi and Minister Mchunu about the 6 December 2024 operation that took place at this house.
- 95 He told us that the Minister engaged state security on his behalf and utilised grabber machines in order to pick up the identities of the SAPS officials investigating him. Mr Mogotsi thereafter sent him the vehicle registration numbers of the vehicles that came to his property. Mr Matlala disclosed that this is how he came to know of the identities of the two officers who played a key role in the operation.
- 96 He said that the Minister and Brown Mogotsi advised him to go to the High Court and bring a case where he lied about the members of GCI Ops by



claiming that his property had been stolen and that they were harassing him. He confirmed that he followed that advice – thinking that it would get the GCI Ops team off his back. He was then advised to go to Soweto and introduced to a Colonel who took his statement but that did not go anywhere. They then suggested he file a complaint at IPID alleging that his wife was assaulted by SAPS members during the operation. But Mr Matlala declined to involve his wife in these issues.

- 97 He said that he thought that the High Court litigation this would work until a SAPS contingent arrived at the offices of CAT VIP Security for the compliance operation.
- 98 He thereafter reached out to Mr Mogotsi and the Minister and told them that the SAPS wanted to arrest him for the compliance breaches concerning the firearms. He demanded to know how they would protect him. He demanded direct action from the Minister who refused to help him.
- 99 He then flew to KZN to see *uNdosi*, I understood this to be a reference to the former Minister of Police Bheki Cele. He then told Minister Cele, that he had a problem on his hands with the GCI Ops Team. He explained what he was experiencing to former Minister Cele and admitted to him that he lied in the High Court application. Alarmingly Mr Matlala says that when he was speaking to



Minister Cele, he was wearing the very Rolex watch that he claimed was taken by the team.

100 My sense from this interaction with Mr Matlala was frustrated because he had funding the Minister's presidential campaign and expected something in return. He was visibly disappointed by the fact that not only had his SAPS tender been cancelled but he had now been the subject of several police operations and an arrest. He told us that on the day of his arrest he sent a message to Brown Mogotsi saying he was going to expose everything.

101 In discussion with us, he threatened to go to the High Court to make an affidavit exposing his relationship with the Minister and incriminating him. He told Mr Mogotsi that before he even challenged the merits of the cancellation – he was going to publicly expose his relationship with the Minister.

102 When asked how he sent money to the Minister – he responded that he regularly sent money through a company, and those funds were transmitted through Mogotsi to the Minister. He provided us with those account details and explained that after sending payment – he would send Mr Mogotsi “proof of payment.”

103 One such example for funding was his sponsorship of the Minister's delegates to attend the January 8 celebrations of the African National Congress. Mr Matlala explained that the Minister had his own delegates – mayors and



Members of Parliament that needed funding to attend. He informed us that he used a company called Gotlhe Specialist to fund flights, accommodation and entertainment of those delegates. The list of those delegates was provided to him by Mr Mogotsi.

GEN SIBIYA

104 When questioned on how he met Gen Sibiya, Mr Matlala explained that he used to provide security services to the late Mr Msibi, also known as Mswazi or the old man. Through this he met a variety of persons, in particular members of the Big 5. He explained that Mr Msibi oversaw this group and they referred to each other as brothers.

105 Mr Matlala explained that his relationship with Gen Sibiya was based on money.

106 He explained that Gen Sibiya was close to the old man. He described Gen Sibiya as a criminal himself. After the old man Mr Msibi also known as Mswazi died, Gen Sibiya came to him and said Mswazi is no longer here – please take care of me and I will take care of you. He understood this as a reference to financial support. So he would give him payments of around R500 000 at a time.



- 107 Mr Matlala similarly expressed disappointment with Gen Sibiya. He said that Gen Sibiya was aware of his ongoing challenges with the SAPS but did not come to his aid, despite giving him various forms of financial support.
- 108 He said he would go to Gen Sibiya's house to give him money. He also said that Gen Sibiya has a townhouse in Sandton where has dropped off money before. He explained that Gen Sibiya would not accept EFT.
- 109 Mr Matlala explained that he regularly advanced funds to Gen Sibiya. He explained that upon the payment of an invoice submitted to the SAPS for work performed during his tender, he would send money to Gen Sibiya. Sometimes as much as R1 000 000 a month.
- 110 Mr Matlala provided us with various phone numbers for Gen Sibiya. We questioned him on how the money was transferred from Mr Matlala to Gen Sibiya. He informed us that there is a member of SAPS, a Sergeant FE Nkosi who facilitates the transfer of money from Mr Matlala to Gen Sibiya. Mr Matlala provided us with Mr Nkosi's phone numbers and the relevant ABSA account details. Mr Matlala had saved Sergeant FE Nkosi as W/O FE Nkosi in his phone, but our investigations determined that he is in fact a Sergeant based as National Organised Crime Unit.
- 111 In one instance, his son was getting married. He was invited to the party. On the day of the party, he gave Gen Sibiya R300 000. Another time he went to



the Gen's office at National Office and placed money in the dustbin in the bathroom attached to his office.

112 In Jan 2025, Gen Sibiya was buying a plot of land in Midrand, the plot was registered under the name of his wife, with the intention of converting it into a Bed and Breakfast. Mr Matlala explained that he gave Gen Sibiya R2 000 000 million for that project. He states that he dropped the money off in cash at a house located within an estate in Sandton as directed. Then Gen Sibiya came out of a house and collected the funds from him. Mr Matlala thereafter drove off.

113 Mr Matlala also revealed that he gave Gen Sibiya 20 impalas for his plot, but all the impalas died.

114 As explained above, Mr Matlala was upset and frustrated. He explained that it has since dawned on him that he was being used and that Gen Sibiya put him through a difficult time. He said that despite being a Deputy National Commissioner he didn't make calls to assist him when police descended on his home and business.

GEN FEROZ KHAN

115 He divulged details concerning the disciplinary charges that Gen Khan had been facing at the SAPS. He indicated that Gen Khan had demanded 2.5



million from him and that he paid him about R500 000. He said that Gen Khan was threatening him, which he did not like.

GEN SHIBIRI

116 Mr Matlala told us that he gave Gen Shibiri R80 000. The money was sent to him in celebration of his promotion to the rank of Maj-Gen. The funds were paid through a company called Black AK Trading. He explained that Gen Shibiri reversed the money back to him and requested that it be paid to him in cash in order to limit a paper trail.

RETALIATORY EFFORTS AGAINST OUR WORK

117 I want to inform the Commission that the work we do is constantly the subject of constant attacks.

118 On 30 Jan 2025, I proceeded to Groenpunt Correctional Facility and interviewed inmate who claimed close proximity with Molefe. This inmate indicated that he had – been tasked by Pule Tau to arrange for the hitman – hitman to kill Sergeants [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The arrangements were to contact Muzi (contact of Tau) and Manana (Tau's daughter). In compensation for organising the hit – the informant would receive R50 000 and arrange a lawyer for his appeal. The inmate further stated that Tau's legal rep (Frans Mashele



had advanced copies of documents in docket) and provided the two accused prior to the disclosure of the docket.

119 In addition to this, meritless cases are brought against us which serve to distract members, instill fear and undermine the Team in the eyes of the public.

120 I have addressed the Commission on the case opened by Mr Matlala in December 2024, which was ultimately withdrawn.

121 In December 2024, three additional cases were opened by Ms. Fundiswa Nyangule the partner of accused Mr. Katiso “KT” Molefe, and by two of his relatives, Ms. Lebogang Molefe and Mr Phumulo Fana Moloi. The respective case numbers were Douglasdale CAS 425/12/2024, Katlegong CAS 237/12/2024, and Kliptown CAS 410/12/2024; all pertained to allegations of kidnapping. The alleged incident occurred when the three complainants accompanied members of PKTT to a relative’s residence in search of a suspect. After assisting the team, the complainants were returned to their original location and at no point were they detained, kidnapped, or deprived of their liberty. These cases are currently at IPID. I have detailed above that they are far-fetched and serve an ulterior purpose.

122 In January 2025, Captain Makgotloe, a ballistic expert with Forensic Services, opened a kidnapping case (Loate CAS 118/01/2025). The allegations arose during an investigation into inconsistencies in a ballistic report. Captain



Makgotloe escorted the investigative team to his office to provide an original report previously sent via email. Upon the team's discovery of discrepancies in multiple reports and their subsequent request to seize Captain Makgotloe's computer, he alleged that he had been kidnapped.

123 I am the subject of adverse allegations in this case. Sergeant [REDACTED] has dealt with this in detail in her witness statement.

CONCLUSION

124 At this juncture, I would like to address the Commission about the impact of this case on my life.

125 I am a career policeman. I have never worked for an organisation other than the SAPS. I have never worked in any capacity outside of law enforcement. I view my work as a member of SAPS as a calling and not just employment. I wear my badge with pride and view my work as an invaluable contribution to the community.

126 In my years at SAPS, I have encountered my fair share of challenges. This includes long hours, suppressed pay, a lack of recognition for sacrifices made and the pain that comes from meeting victims of crime and bearing the responsibility to seek justice for them.



- 127 However, this case has taken more from me than I ever could have imagined.
- 128 I am not living a life. I am living a shadow of my former life. On the professional front, I am no longer able to execute my duties in the manner I previously did. Because I cannot move freely in public without 24-hour protection, it is difficult to meet with informants or make new connections. As my current condition is not conducive to blending in and meeting people in order to get information. I cannot go to Court normally and seek my orders – my movements are not free and spontaneous.
- 129 On the personal front, I cannot live a normal life. I cannot go to the gym or eat out without risking my life. I have a family that I am deeply committed to – but I cannot take my family to a shopping mall or arrange that we go out on holiday. I rarely see my family because doing so is a direct endangerment of their lives. This has alienated me from my family, in particular my wife and children who I have not seen in an extended period of time.
- 130 I bring this to the Commission's attention because its important for them to know the sacrifice of ordinary SAPS members. We are at the coal face of justice and face the raw unfiltered reality of fighting crime in the country. But even with all my sacrifice and hard work - I am on the entry level of the SAPS. My colleagues and I are ordinary SAPS members, and we need assistance in breaking down corruption and the politicisation of the SAPS.



- 131 It is difficult for us to execute our duties when the corrupt individuals we have encountered are senior ranking members in the SAPS. It is impossible to fight well-resourced, organised and ruthless criminals when your own superiors are co-opted and complicit in criminality. With the current environment, South Africa will not win the war on organised crime – CIT, transborder hijacking, drugs, kidnappings and extortion.
- 132 Corruption within SAPS, only makes it hard to do our work, but it is disillusioning. It is career limiting and causes disassociation from our colleagues who avoid us. Our colleagues know that you are investigating these cases and avoid you for fear of facing repercussions.
- 133 I make this statement not to seek sympathy but to make the Commission alive to the reality of committed, ethical and ordinary SAPS members. I am grateful to Gen Mkhwanazi who lifted the lid on our circumstances.
- 134 This is the conclusion of my testimony at this juncture.



